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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________ 
 
No. 12-3368 
_________________ 
 
DA LE LIU, 
                 Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
           Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A077 322 811) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Nicole Kim 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 7, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 8, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Da Le Liu, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of an order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals, which denied his motion to reopen removal proceedings.  
For the reasons below, we will deny the petition for review. 
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 Liu entered the United States without proper documentation in September 2000.  
He was scheduled to appear before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) on March 15, 2001, to 
apply for asylum based on allegations that his girlfriend had been forced to have an 
abortion.  Liu did not appear, and the IJ entered an in absentia removal order.  Liu filed a 
motion to reopen, citing traffic problems, but the IJ denied the motion, and the BIA 
dismissed his appeal on February 26, 2002. 
 On December 8, 2011, Liu, represented by a new attorney, filed a motion to 
reopen, based on allegations of changed country conditions in China since the time of his 
original hearing.  Liu noted that he had, since the time of his scheduled hearing, married 
his girlfriend and had two children in the United States.  He asserted that there was 
increased enforcement of the population policy in China since 2002.
1
  He also noted that 
he had become a Christian, and he asserted eligibility for asylum and withholding relief 
due to his fear of religious persecution in light of the increase in human rights abuses 
committed against members of unregistered churches in China.  
 The BIA denied the motion to reopen as untimely, and noted that Liu had not 
attempted to satisfy requirements for equitable tolling based on attorney ineffectiveness.  
The BIA also found that Liu had not established changed country conditions for those 
who have violated family planning policies or for Christians.  Liu filed a timely petition 
for review. 
                                              
1
 As discussed below, the proper reference date would be March 2001, when the 
proceedings before the IJ were to take place. 
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review the BIA’s denial of 
Liu’s motion to reopen, and we apply the abuse of discretion standard to our review.  See 
Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  Under that standard, Liu must 
show that the BIA’s decision was somehow arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  See 
id.  Motions to reopen are reserved for only “compelling circumstances.”  See Guo v. 
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 There is no dispute that Liu’s motion to reopen was untimely, as it was not filed 
with the BIA within ninety days of the BIA’s 2002 decision.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  However, the ninety-day requirement 
does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed country conditions arising in 
the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and 
would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”  8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  Here, Liu would have to show 
that he is eligible to file a second asylum application in reopened proceedings based on 
his new Christian faith and on changed country conditions since the time of his scheduled 
hearing before the IJ.  See Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 252 (3d Cir. 2006) (change in 
country conditions is measured from time of proceedings before immigration judge).  We 
have recognized that an alien who has been ordered removed can file an untimely or 
successive asylum application based on changed personal conditions if the alien can also 
show changed country conditions in the motion to reopen.  See Liu v. Att’y Gen., 
555 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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 Liu contends that the BIA “ignored” the evidence he presented in denying his 
motion to reopen.  On the contrary, the BIA examined Liu’s evidence and found that it 
was “not sufficient to meet his burden of establishing that there has been a material 
change in conditions in China either for individuals who have had two children while 
living abroad or for members of unregistered churches.” A.R. 4.  The BIA noted that 
although Liu had submitted evidence regarding enforcement of population policy in 2010 
and 2011, and articles regarding the treatment of Christians dating from 2008 to 2011, he 
had not submitted any evidence as to the treatment of those two groups in 2001.  In his 
brief, Liu points to a 2002 article explaining the implementation of China’s Population 
and Family Planning Law.  We agree with the BIA that the article “does not spell out 
what the government policy was before the law was passed or establish that either the 
policy or the implementation and enforcement of the policy in [Liu’s] hometown has 
changed since March 2001.” Id.  With regard to his claim of changed circumstances for 
Christians, Liu notes that “one of Petitioner’s articles specifically mentions the worsening 
conditions Christians face each year.”  Petitioner’s Br. at 10.  However, that article only 
reports “an overall increase in reported persecutions of believers” in comparing 2007 
with 2006.  A.R. 176.  The article makes no mention of treatment of Christians in 2001.   
 Having examined the evidence, we agree that Liu did not meet his burden of 
showing a material change of relevant conditions in China since 2001.  Because Liu did 
not present material evidence of changed country conditions, the BIA did not abuse its 
discretion in denying his motion to reopen.  
